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PHYSICIANS

AND

SURGEONS-MALPRACTICE-INFORMED

CONSENT

OF PATENT: DUTY TO INFORM PATIENT TO BE ESTABLISHED BY
EXPERT MEDICAL TEsTiMoNY-ZeBarth v. Swedish HospitalMedical

Center, 81 Wn. 2d 12,499 P.2d 1 (1972).
Plaintiff was suffering from a highly malignant form of cancer resulting in serious obstruction of the trachea. He was admitted to the
defendant hospital where it was determined that radiation therapy was
necessary to reduce the obstruction before it completely blocked the
plaintiff's breathing.' After completion of the radiation therapy, plaintiff began to suffer from a progressive paralysis which plaintiff
claimed was caused by damage to his spinal cord, attributable to the
manner in which the radiation was administered.
Plaintiff sued in the Superior Court for King County, alleging that
since he was neither warned of the risk of damage to his spinal cord
from the radiation nor informed that two courses of treatment were
open to him, the defendant should be held liable for damages resulting
from failure to obtain the plaintiff's informed consent. Judgment for
the plaintiff was appealed to the Supreme Court of Washington. Held:
Affirmed. A physician is liable for damages proximately resulting from
his negligent failure to perform his duty to disclose to a patient the
risk of serious harm which accompanies a proposed course of treatment, and to inform him of possible alternative procedures. This duty
generally must be established by expert medical testimony or reasonable inferences drawn from such testimony. ZeBarth v. Swedish Hospital Medical Center, 81 Wn. 2d 12, 499 P.2d 1 (1972).
The doctrine of informed consent has had a tortured history since
its introduction into modem case law in Natanson v. Kline.2 The pre1. That lack of treatment would have resulted in almost certain death is not disputed. ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Medical Center, 81 Wn. 2d 12, 14, 499 P.2d 1, 4
(1972). The course of treatment which was pursued consisted of an initial massive dose
of 1,000 Roentgen followed by several lesser doses. In the opinion of the attending physicians, any lesser initial dosage would have served only to increase the swelling and
totally obstruct the patient's breathing. The physicians felt that the only safe course of
conduct would be to use a heavy dose of radiation to reduce the swelling immediately.
Id. at 16-17, 499 P.2d at 5. However, evidence was introduced at trial that a series of
lesser, fractionated dosages might have achieved the same result.
2. 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960), modified, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670
(1960). See also Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d I1 (Mo. 1960). While these two cases

were not the first to deal with the doctrine of informed consent [see, e.g., Schloendorff v.
Society ofN.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914)], they heralded an era in which

informed consent increasingly became gounds for malpractice actions.
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cise nature of the standard of disclosure, the necessity for expert medical testimony, and the means of showing proximate cause have been
debated, temporarily resolved and subsequently altered by courts
which have grappled with the concept. The State of Washington has
not escaped the resulting confusion. In addressing itself to the informed consent doctrine in ZeBarth v. Swedish Hospital Medical Center,3 the Washington Supreme Court confronted three conflicting
theories advanced by the three divisions of the Washington Court of
Appeals. 4 The supreme court thus had the opportunity to resolve the
issue with clarity and certainty, and the ZeBarth opinion seemed to
have accomplished this task. However, four months later the supreme
court's opinion in Hunter v. Brown5 served to undo much of what
ZeBarth had accomplished, adding yet a new dimension to the confusion reigning in Washington over the doctrine of informed consent.
I.

THE TROUBLED PAST

In a 1954 decision, Woods v. Pommerening,6 the Washington Supreme Court first articulated guidelines for informed consent cases. In
Woods the court found for the defendant/physician because "it was
not the customary standard of practice to tell the patient all the risks
involved nor to recite the symptoms; [and] the judgment of the individual doctor had to be exercised in the light of the mental and psychosomatic makeup of the patient in advising of the risks involved ....1-7
Thus the defendant was held to the traditional standard of care in
medical malpractice cases-that established by the practice of his
fellow physicians. 8 Furthermore, the plaintiff had the traditional

3. 81 Wn. 2d 12, 499 P.2d 1 (1972).
4. Hunter v. Brown, 4 Wn. App. 899, 484 P.2d 1162 (1971); Mason v. Ellsworth, 3
Wn. App. 298, 474 P.2d 909 (1970); Watkins v. Parpala, 2 Wn. App. 484, 469 P.2d 974

(1970).
5. 81 Wn. 2d 465, 502 P.2d 1194 (1972).
6. 44 Wn. 2d 867, 271 P.2d 705 (1954). It is interesting that this case largely has
escaped mention in the current informed consent cases in Washington.
7. 44 Wn. 2d at 871, 271 P.2d at 707.
8. Dean Prosser, in discussing the doctrine of informed consent, states:
[I]t began to be recognized that this was really a matter of the standard of professional conduct, since there will be some patients to whom disclosure may be undesirable or even dangerous for success of the treatment or the patient's own welfare; and that what should be done is a matter for professional judgment in the light
of the applicable medical standards. Accordingly, the prevailing view now is that
the action, regardless of its form, is in reality one for negligence in failing to con-
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burden of introducing expert testimony to show departure from this
standard. 9
No Washington case took serious issue with this standard until
1970-71, when three conflicting opinions were handed down by the
three divisions of the Washington Court of Appeals. In the first case,
Watkins v. Parpala,'0 Division Two set forth a standard essentially
compatible with that in Woods: "[W] e think the question of whether
or not a particular risk should be disclosed should have the same evidentiary requirements as any other act of malpractice."" However, in
its opinion in Mason v. Ellsworth,12 Division Three of the Washington
Court of Appeals reached a far different conclusion. Influenced in
4
part by a California decision,' 3 that court concluded:'
[A] plaintiff, to establish a prima facie case when [he] was informed
of the nature and purpose of the procedure, must allege and prove: (1)
[he] was not informed of a reasonably foreseeable risk, or that [he]
inquired of defendant as to any risks involved in the proposed procedure and was not informed of same; (2) if [he] had been informed, he
would not have proceeded with the procedure; and (3) [he] has been
injured as a result of submitting to the procedure.
Thus, the Mason court eliminated the requirement that the plaintiff
show by expert testimony that the doctor's disclosures failed to meet
the accepted standard of medical practice. However, it expressly required the plaintiff to show proximate cause by proving that if he had
been informed he would not have consented to the procedure.
In Hunter v. Brown,15 Division One of the Washington Court of
form to the proper standard, to be determined on the basis of expert testimony as
to what disclosure should be made.
W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTs 165 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted).
9. Id.
10. 2 Wn. App. 484, 469 P.2d 974 (1970).
11. Id. at 492 469 P.2d at 979.
12. 3 Wn. App. 298,474 P.2d 909 (1970).
13. Berkey v. Anderson, 1 Cal. App. 3d 790, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1969). Berkey held
that expert medical testimony was not required in informed consent actions and that the
medical standard of practice was not determinative in these cases. However, two more
recent California appellate court decisions, Cobbs v. Grant, 23 Cal. App. 3d 236, 100
Cal. Rptr. 98 (1972), and Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381
(1971), considered and rejected the Berkey holding, concluding that the introduction of
expert testimony as to a professional standard of disclosure was a necessary burden for
the plaintiff to sustain.
14. 3 Wn. App. at 313,474 P.2d at 919.
15. 4 Wn. App. 899, 484 P.2d 1162 (197 1). For a discussion of the Washington Supreme Court's treatment of Hunter, see the text accompanying note 50 infra.
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Appeals examined both the Watkins and Mason standards before pro16
posing yet another test:
We hold that if a patient-plaintiff presents substantial evidence that
(1) his physician failed to disclose material facts reasonably necessary
to form the basis of an intelligent consent, and (2) he has been injured
as a result of submitting to a surgical procedure, he has made out a
prima facie case.
Here again the court eliminated the expert testimony requirement; it
further eliminated any necessity of showing a causal link between the
lack of informed consent and the resulting injury.
Thus, at the time ZeBarth came before the Washington Supreme
Court, the simple holding of Woods had been misplaced, ignored and
overwhelmed by the confusion resulting from the differing theories
expressed in Watkins, Mason and Hunter.
The problems involved in formulating a workable standard of
physician/patient disclosure stem from three primary sources: (1) the
classification of an informed consent action as sounding in negligence
or battery; (2) the requirement and complications of proving proximate cause; and (3) the determination of the standard of disclosure to
which a physician will be held. The court in ZeBarth recognized and
dealt with all of these.
II.

NEGLIGENCE OR BATTERY?

While the importance of classifying an informed consent action as
one sounding in negligence or battery has been either ignored or
glossed over by the Washington appellate courts, it is a fundamental
distinction which must be made before any coherent doctrine can be
developed. If a battery theory is adopted, an uninformed consent is
tantamount to no consent.1 7 Therefore, the physician who treats a pa16. 4 Wn. App. at 907-08, 484 P.2d at 1167. The standard developed in Hunter was
based largely on a definition of a physician's duty of care proposed by a California author:
A physician is under an obligation (1) to make a full disclosure of all known material risks in a proposed operation or course of treatment except for those risks of
which the patient is likely to know or (2) to prove the reasonableness of any lesser
disclosure or the immateriality of the undisclosed risk.
Comment, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1396, 1407
(1967) (footnotes omitted), quoted in 4 Wn. App. at 907, 484 P.2d at 1167.
17. See PROSSER, supra note 8, at 104. For an analysis of the differences between the
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tient without obtaining an informed consent is strictly liable for any
damages which follow this unconsented touching, whether or not he
has acted negligently. Once having established the unconsented touching, the plaintiff would be relieved of the burden of proving proximate
cause. Whether or not the plaintiff would have refused the course of
treatment had he been informed of its attendant risks becomes
irrelevant-if he was not informed and was injured as a result of the
"touching," the physician is liable. While some California courts have
followed the battery theory,' 8 they have been leery of its effects and
have modified the cause of action: 19
Battery being an intentional tort requires in this situation, proof of
a higher degree of culpability than ordinary negligence in failing to
inform a patient of some aspect of proposed medical treatment.
Further, the plaintiff must establish as part of his burden of proof
that the information which was withheld was of such significange that
had it been disclosed, consent would not have been given.
Although Mason and Hunter rely heavily on California decisions,
notably Berkey v. Anderson,20 neither case suggests Washington has
adopted or should adopt a battery theory. Both of these decisions
merely hint that Washington employs a negligence theory.2 1 While the
battery and negligence approaches, see McCoid, A Reappraisalof Liabilityfor Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 MINN. L. REV. 381, 382-85 (1957).
18. See, e.g., Dow v. Kaiser Foundation, 12 Cal. App. 3d 488, 90 Cal. Rptr. 747
(1970) (but see note 19 infra);Berkey v. Anderson, I Cal. App. 3d 790, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67
(1969). However, other California appellate courts have chosen to follow the negligence
theory. See Cobbs v. Grant, 23 Cal. App. 3d 313, 100 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1972); Carmichael
v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971).
19. Dow v. Kaiser Foundation, 12 Cal. App. 3d 488, 90 Cal. Rptr. 747, 758 (1970).
Due to a series of events occuring sTibsequent to the court of appeals' decision in Dow,
the California Supreme Court has ordered the case removed from bound volume 12 of
the California Appellate Reports, 3rd Series. The California Supreme Court granted a
hearing in the Dow case, which under California law renders the court of appeals' decision "a nullity and of no force and effect." However, before the supreme court handed
down its decision in Dow, the parties reached a settlement, thereby effectively erasing
the court of appeals' opinion from the California Appellate Reports. See Brief of Respondent, Appendix A, ZeBarth v. Swedish Hospital Medical Center, 81 Wn. 2d 12,499
P.2d 1 (1972). The case still may be found in the California Reporter, however. While
Dow is now of no legal effect or authority in California, it is still sound evidence of the
dispute and confusion reigning among the California appellate courts as to the nature
and requirements of an informed consent action.
20. 1 Cal. App. 3d 790, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1969). For a discussion of this case see
note 13 supra.
21. On the other hand, the court in Watkins was of the view that informed consent
cases sound in negligence:
Where no consent is given, it is logical to infer the intent necessary to ground an
action for assault and battery. But where the patient has consented to the procedure
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court in Mason stated, "for want of a better word we could use
negligence, '2 2 the court in Hunter failed to go even that far. The
23
Hunter court finessed the point in its discussion of the two theories:
It can be argued that logically, an "uninformed" consent is tantamount
to no consent and that surgery performed thereafter should be treated
in law as a battery. This has been the holding in some jurisdictions.
. . .However, most courts have chosen to ascribe the compensable
wrong to a breach of duty on the part of the physician, rather than an
assault. Although not in agreement as to the precise nature of the
"wrong," courts have generally but with resulting confusion labeled
the breach of duty theory as the doctrine of "informed consent."
Fortunately, ZeBarth sets the issue at rest and expressly holds: "A
doctor or specialist who fails to discharge this duty to inform would
thus be liable for negligence ...."-24 By resolving this fundamental
question, the court opened the way for a determination of the more
elusive issues: the problems of proving proximate cause and the
proper standard of disclosure.
I1.

PROXIMATE CAUSE

Of signal importance in ZeBarth is the court's recognition and
treatment of proximate cause. 25 A basic element of any cause of action sounding in negligence, proximate cause sometimes is overlooked
in informed consent cases.2 6 Tort theory suggests that a physician
should be liable only for those damages proximately caused by his

and it becomes a question of whether or not the physician (or dentist) has disclosed
the risks inherent in the procedure to the patient, it is difficult to view that failure, if
any, as an intentional tort. We, therefore, prefer to classify the doctrine in the
normal negligence or malpractice area.
2 Wn. App. at 490-91, 469 P.2d at 978 (footnotes omitted).
22. 3 Wn. App. at 306, 474 P.2d at 915.
23. 4 Wn. App. at 903-04, 484 P.2d at 1165.
24. 81 Wn. 2d at 26, 499 P.2d at 10 (emphasis added).
25. Although the ZeBarth court broadly framed its discussion of causation in terms
of "proximate cause," the court specifically used a cause in fact analysis; that is, it employed the traditional "but for" test. For a discussion of the relationship between proximate cause and cause in fact, see PROSSER, supra note 8, at 236-39.
26. One of the basic flaws in the standard proposed by the Hunter court is that it
imposed no proximate cause requirement. See text accompanying note 16 supra. Unlike
Hunter, the Mason test does require proof of proximate cause. See text accompanying
note 14 supra. However, the court in that case failed to give any guidelines as to what
was necessary for the plaintiff to show to accomplish that proof.
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failure to disclose. If the patient would have pursued the course of
treatment regardless of whether he was informed of the attendant
risks, the physician should not be held liable for failure to disclose
those risks.
The Washington appellate courts apparently disagreed as to the
issue of proximate cause in informed consent cases. Mason specifically
set forth the requirement; Hunter disregarded. it.2 7 The ZeBarth court
resolved the issue by acknowledging proximate cause as an element of
the cause of action.2 8 Further, it recognized the basic problem in
proving proximate cause in an informed consent action: namely, that
while the testimony of the plaintiff as to what he would have done had
he been informed is relevant to the issue, it cannot be conclusive by
itself. In practice, the plaintiff's perfunctory assertion that he would
have refused the treatment had he been informed of its risks may become an implicit prerequisite of maintaining a successful informed
consent action, possessing little evidentiary value.2 9 ZeBarth attempts
to deal with this problem by stating that proximate cause is established when " It] he totality of the evidence permits an inference...-30
that the plaintiff would not have accepted the course of treatment
had he been informed of the attendant risks. It is the substance of all
the evidence, not just the testimony of the plaintiff, which determines
the existence of proximate cause.
Thus ZeBarth establishes proximate cause as an essential element
of an informed consent action. Beyond this, however, the clarity of
the opinion lapses somewhat. The court indicated that "[t] he plaintiff
did not categorically state. . ." and that "the plaintiff did not testify
directly. .. ,,3 that had he been informed he would not have pursued
the course of treatment. Yet the court sustained the jury's finding of

27.

See text accompanying notes 14 and 16 supra for the requirements these courts

set forth for establishing a prima facie case.
28. "Integral to the rule of informed consent is the issue of proximate cause." 81
Wn. 2d at 30,499 P.2d at 12.

29. As the ZeBarth court states:
The law does not encourage formulaic or catechistic responses, but looks instead
to substance. For the plaintiff to say, after the fact of injury, that he would have
refused the initial massive dose, adds little to the credible proof. Although admissible,
a statement of that nature is little more than a transparently self-serving response,
inviting the recital of a formulated catechism to put form above substance.
81Wn. 2d at 31,499 P.2d at 13.
30. Id.

31.

Id. at 30.499 P.2d at 12.
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proximate cause from the "totality of the evidence." The result is
curious-the plaintiff, whose decision-making processes are central to
the case, apparently need not testify that an adequate disclosure of the
risks would have changed his mind about pursuing the treatment. Although such an assertion is most likely an empty formality, the lack of
it leaves a gaping hole in the logic of the proof of proximate cause.
Undoubtedly the ZeBarth court was reluctant to defeat the plaintiff's
action over a minor technicality. It is submitted, however, that the
court might have better served future litigants by setting aside its sympathies and following the Mason court's firm requirement that the
plaintiff both allege and prove that but for the lack of his informed
32
consent he would not have pursued the course of treatment.
IV.

THE STANDARD OF DISCLOSURE

ZeBarth's analysis of the physician's standard of disclosure is the
crux of the opinion. The disclosure standard, widely discussed by recent commentators,3 3 has been the source of conflicting opinion
among the three divisions of the Washington Court of Appeals. 34 The
ZeBarth opinion has resolved that conflict.
In malpractice actions not involving informed consent the physician historically has been held to the standard of care practiced by his
fellow physicians.35 A lesser standard-the reasonable man standard
-is both inappropriate and impractical. By holding himself out to
have specialized skill in the medical field, a physician binds himself to
live up to the standards of others practicing that skill. Furthermore,
the nature and complexity of his skill is such that it is impossible to
36
apply a reasonable man standard.
Although the use of a professional standard of conduct in tradi-

32. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
33. The ZeBarth court cited a lengthy list of the most recent law review articles on
the subject of informed consent. 81 Wn. 2d at 28-29, 499 P.2d at 11-12. Two articles
which argue strongly against the ZeBarth court's conclusion that the plaintiff has the
burden of introducing expert medical testimony as evidence of a professional standard
of disclosure are Comment, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice, 55 CALIF. L.
REV. 1396 (1967), and 75 HARV. L. REV. 1445 (1962).
34. See text accompanying notes 7-16 supra.
35. PROSSER, supra note 8, at 162-63.
36. For example, a determination of how a reasonable man would have performed
an appendectomy would be useless in judging whether the operation was done negligently.
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tional malpractice actions has never been seriously challenged, it has
become the focal point of much debate and conffict in informed consent cases.3 7 If a professional standard is not employed in this one
aspect of malpractice litigation, it must be because the reasons justifying its application elsewhere are not present in informed consent
actions. The question becomes whether a physician's duty to inform
his patient is so inherently fused.with his medical skills that it should
be weighed against a professional standard, or whether it is somehow
separable from these skills and thus can be measured in reasonable
man terms.
The physician must draw upon his medical expertise in determining
both what and how much to disclose to his patient. His professional
evaluation of the risks involved, their severity relative to the individual patient and the possible alternative courses of treatment are all
determinations involving medical judgments which the ordinary
layman is incapable of making. When making these medical determinations a physician therefore should be held to a professional standard
of conduct. However, once these assessments have been made the
physician must decide whether to inform his patient of any or all attendant risks and alternative procedures. If this decision is one which
a layman is capable of comprehending and implementing, then the
decision should be judged by reasonable man standards. If, on the
other hand, the evaluation of the physical and psychological risks of
informing a patient demands a special medical expertise not possessed
by the reasonable layman, then a professional standard of disclosure is
appropriate. Alternatively, one might eliminate this aspect of the decision-making process altogether by concluding, as did the Washington
Court of Appeals in Hunter,38 that once the determination of material
risks and alternative courses of treatment has been made, the duty to
disclose them to the patient becomes absolute. 39
The court in ZeBarth concluded that both the determination of the
materiality of the information and the decision whether to disclose it
40
should be judged against professional standards:

37. See note 33 supra.
38. 4Wn.App. at 906, 484 P.2d at 1166.
39. According to the analysis in Hunter, reasons why the defendant/physician withheld material information would be a matter of defense, to be judged by reasonable
man standards. Id. at 906-07, 484 P.2d at 1166-67.
40. 81 Wn. 2d at 24, 499 P.2d at 9.
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This duty [to inform the patient] . . .is limited to those disclo-

sures which according to the recognized medical standards of that specialty, should be given by a reasonable doctor practicing the same specialty.
The court thus rejects both (a) the idea that a reasonable man would
know whether the information should be given, and (b) the view that
there is an absolute duty to give the material information in all cases.
'4 1
In so doing the court limits somewhat the patient's "right to know,"
and joins a clear majority of courts which have adhered to the profes42
sional standard in informed consent cases.
There is doubtless a certain risk in allowing a profession "to determine its own responsibilities. '43 However, when a physician makes a
decision to withhold significant information from a patient for medical reasons----"cases in which a patient is irrationally apprehensive or
where disclosure of a risk might be psychologically detrimental 44that judgment, the product of the physician's own training and expertise, should be measured against the standards of those similarly experienced in these difficult and delicate matters. This is not to argue that
the medical profession should be allowed to exculpate itself where the
decision not to disclose is made for non-medical reasons-perhaps in
the fatherly belief that "this is best for the patient," or even out of
mere convenience-by claiming that no doctor ever discloses this
kind of information. ZeBarth implies that if a physician withholds
information for non-medical reasons, he cannot be said to be satisfying a standard of sound medical practice and therefore should be
found negligent for failure to adhere to that standard. This result depends in part upon a belief that the medical profession will maintain
41. See the appellate court's discussion of this point in Mason, 3 Wn. App. at 308,
474 P.2d at 916.
42. The cases requiring expert testimony concerning professional standards in informed consent actions are far too numerous to list completely. A representative sampling includes: Cobbs v. Grant, 23 Cal. App. 3d 313, 100 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1972); DiFilippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961); Ditlow v. Kaplan, 181 So. 2d 226
(Fla. App. 1965); Grosjean v. Spencer, 140 N.W.2d 139 (Iowa 1966); Natanson v.
Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960); Haggerty v. McCarthy, 344 Mass. 136, 181
N.E.2d 562 (1962); Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965); Petterson v. Lynch, 59
Misc. 2d 469, 299 N.Y.S.2d 244 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Woods v. Pommerening, 44 Wn. 2d
867, 271 P.2d 705 (1954).
43. Hunter, 4 Wn. App. at 906, 484 P.2d at 1166, quoting Berkey v. Anderson, I
Cal. App. 3d 790, 805, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67, 78 (1969).
44. Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 628,
642 (1970).
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sound standards of practice. The alternative would be to allow a jury
to determine the validity of what might be a purely medical judgment
to withhold information. Faced with such a choice, the ZeBarth court
accepted the traditional 45 and majority view, 4 6 namely, that medical
men must be trusted in medical matters.
V.

EXPERT TESTIMONY

Once the determination of the nature of the standard of disclosure
to which a physician will be held has been made, answers to questions
on the need for and use of expert medical testimony begin to fall into
place. If the physician is held to the standard practiced in his profession, as the court in ZeBarth decided, then expert testimony must be
introduced to establish that practice before any departure from it can
be shown. The ZeBarth holding therefore necessitates the introduction
of expert testimony, which must address two issues: (1) what information was significant and material under the circumstances, and (2)
whether a reasonably prudent physician would have disclosed that
47

information.
ZeBarth thus returns informed consent actions in Washington to
the realm of traditional malpractice cases. In so doing it burdens the
plaintiff with the task of finding and furnishing expert medical testimony, a burden which may seem unfair in view of the physician's
easier access to that testimony. 48 Nevertheless, ZeBarth requires that
the plaintiff show that the defendant departed from the duty "to inform his patient what a reasonably prudent medical specialist would
tell a person of ordinary understanding ... -49 to establish a prima
facie case of malpractice. There is only one way to show what a reasonably prudent medical specialist would have done, and that is to
have such a specialist testify. As long as the prevailing standard of
45. See note 35 supra.
-46. See note 42 supra for a representative sampling of cases.
47. "Whether the information should have been given at all and the nature, kind and
extent of the disclosure thus must in most instances be established by expert medical testimony." 81 Wn. 2d at 26, 499 P.2d at 10.
48. Not only does the defendant have better access to the testimony of his fellow
physicians, but many maintain that the plaintiffs burden of furnishing expert medical
testimony is increased due to the infamous "conspiracy of silence." See Belli, An Ancient Therapy Still Applied: The Silent Medical Treatment, 1 VILL. L. REV. 250,
253-56 (1956).
49. 81 Wn. 2d at 29, 499 P.2d at 11.
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medical practice governs a physician's liability, that standard will
have to be demonstrated before any departure from it can be shown.
VI.

THE EFFECT OF HUNTER v. BROWN

Far from being an adventurous opinion, ZeBarth is fundamentally
a conservative one which may be viewed as creating some hardships
for future plaintiffs. The opinion's real value lies in the certainty with
which it defines the nature of informed consent actions and the plaintiff's attendant burdens. Unfortunately, after spending almost a year
developing these guidelines,5 0 the Washington Supreme Court handed
down another opinion, Hunter v. Brown,5 1 which is likely to precipitate anew much of the uncertainty in informed consent actions which
ZeBarth had resolved.
Hunter offered the court a chance to apply the ZeBarth theories to
one of the appellate court cases which created the original confusion
in Washington over informed consent. In Hunter the plaintiff brought
a malpractice action for damages allegedly resulting from a dermabrasion operation performed by the defendant. 52 The defendant/
physician admitted at trial that he knew the possibility of a
successful result was only fifty percent, that there was a possibility of a
worsening of the condition, and that this latter possibility was in53
creased when the patient was of Oriental origin, as was the plaintiff.
While these factors led him to believe the plaintiff was a "borderline
case," he did not inform the plaintiff of the risks. The trial court dismissed the action because the plaintiff failed to introduce expert medical testimony. The court of appeals reversed. The defendant appealed
to the Washington Supreme Court, which found for the plaintiff.
The supreme court's opinion in Hunter displays a brevity which
borders on obliviousness of all of the issues it discussed in ZeBarth.

50. ZeBarth was first argued before the Washington Supreme Court in October
1971, along with Hunter. Letter from Joseph J. Lanza to the Washington Law Review,
July 3, 1972.
51. 81 Wn. 2d 465, 502 P.2d 1194 (1972).
52. The plaintiff had consulted the defendant regarding spots of increased pigmentation on her face, which were diagnosed as chloasma. The defendant recommended and
later performed dermabrasion, a process described as "sandpapering" the skin, thereby
removing the outer layer of the epidermis. Afterwards the plaintiffs condition worsened.
53. 81 Wn. 2d at 467, 502 P.2d at 1196.
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No mention is made of ZeBarth, and no real reasons are given for its
54
terse three-sentence holding:
This is the kind of a case in which no medical standard as to telling
the patient need be proved. As was said in Watkins v. Parpala,supra
at 492, there are cases in which "the disclosure is so obvious [sic] that
laymen can recognize the necessity of such disclosure."
Under the circumstances and considering this was elective surgery
for the attempted improvement of appearance only, the necessity of
disclosure is too clear to require medical testimony.
In malpractice cases there traditionally has been an exception from
the expert testimony requirement for situations in which the physician's negligence is so obvious to the layman that medical testimony
as to the standard of practice becomes superfluous. 55 The surgeon
who leaves a sponge in the patient is the classic example. The ZeBarth
56
opinion recognized a similar exception in informed consent actions,
but refrained from defining the circumstances in which such an exception would be appropriate. Hunter was an ideal case in which to develop such guidelines, but the court shunned the opportunity. Thus,
the rule in Washington now seems to be that expert medical testimony
as to a professional standard of practice is required in informed consent cases, except when it is obvious it is not required. Just when it is
so obvious is anybody's guess.
Some guidelines may be gleaned from Hunter's fact pattern. The
holding seems to turn on the fact that the surgery was elective, that it
was "for the attempted improvement of appearance only,"'57 and that
it was performed by a physician who admitted knowing his patient ran
a fifty percent-plus risk of an unsuccessful result. It is clear that had
the plaintiff been informed of the possible adverse effects and the low
probability of success, she might have pursued the option of foregoing
the treatment. By implication, therefore, a doctor adhering to the
standards of practice of his profession should have known the information was essential to his patient's informed consent.
54. Id. at 468, 502 P.2d at 1196.
55. PROSSER, supra note 8, at 164-65.
56. "We perceive the general rule to be-except in extraordinary circumstances
where the duty to disclose is so clearly manifest that reasonable minds could not in
reason differ on the question--thatthe standards of the medical profession are those to
be applied by the jury in deciding that issue of fact." 81 Wn. 2d at 26-27, 499 P.2d at
10 (emphasis added).
57. 81 Wn. 2d at 468, 502 P.2d at 1196.
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While the result in Hunter is probably sound,5 8 the court's brief,
conclusory opinion will inevitably create problems in future cases as
attorneys and trial courts attempt to determine the circumstances in
which a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case without providing
expert medical testimony. Is the Hunter rule to be applied narrowly,
only to cases of elective, cosmetic surgery where the defendant himself
testifies to a high degree of risk? Conversely, is it to be applied
broadly, whenever the surgery is elective or whenever there is a fifty
percent risk of either an unsuccessful or an adverse result? Further,
what is the trial judge to do when asked to rule on whether expert testimony is necessary? For him to rule that the need for disclosure is so
obvious that the case falls within the Hunter rule would be to usurp
not only the function of the expert witness, but also that of the jury.
Because the Hunter opinion provides no guidelines to which counsel
and courts may look in determining the need for expert medical testimony, Hunter augurs ill for future informed consent litigation in
Washington, presaging a return to the confused state of the doctrine
prior to ZeBarth. It is unfortunate that the same court which devoted
itself to a detailed study of the complexities of the disclosure question
in ZeBarth could dismiss the matter with the casualness displayed in
Hunter.
L.D.K.

58. It might seem that in remanding the case for trial, the supreme court effectively awarded judgment for the plaintiff, having determined that there was a duty to
disclose which the defendant admittedly failed to perform. However, when the plaintiff subsequently moved in superior court for summary judgment on the issue of
liability, the motion was denied. Letter from Joseph L. Lanza to the Washington Law
Review, April 12, 1973. The defendant argued successfully that issues of material
fact still existed on the question of proximate cause-whether or not the plaintiff
would have submitted to the procedure had she been adequately informed. Under
ZeBarth this is clearly a question of fact to be determined by a jury after consideration of the totality of the evidence. 81 Wn. 2d at 31, 499 P.2d at 13. See the discussion of ZeBarth's treatment of proximate cause accompanying note 25 supra.
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